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NOTES
ADOPTION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF UNWED FATHERS
The biological mother and the stepfather of children born out of
wedlock were granted a petition for adoption of the children without
the consent of the father. New York Domestic Relations Law per-
mitted an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to block the
adoption of their child simply by withholding consent.' On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court held that the sex-based distinction
in this provision violates the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment insofar as it discriminates against unwed fathers
and is not substantially related to the state's interest in promoting
the adoption of illegitimate children. Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct.
1760 (1979).
In its treatment of equal protection questions, the Supreme
Court has developed what appears to be a three-tier approach con-
sisting of different levels of judicial scrutiny: minimal, intermediate,
and strict! The minimal scrutiny approach is most often used in
cases involving economic regulation3 and requires the application of
a "rational basis" test. The equal protection clause is violated only if
the classification rests on grounds wholly unrelated to the achieve-
ment of the state's objective; the statutory discrimination will not
be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to
justify it.4 In reviewing classifications which are "suspect"5 or those
1. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977) provides in part: "[Clonsent to
adoption shall be required as follows: . . . (b) Of the parents or surviving parent,
whether adult or infant, of a child born in wedlock; land] (c) Of the mother, whether
adult or infantC of a child born out of wedlock .... " The statute makes parental con-
sent unnecessary under certain circumstances; otherwise the unwed mother has
authority to block the adoption of her child by withholding her consent. Only by show-
ing that an adoption is not in the best interest of his child may an unwed father pre-
vent the termination of his parental rights by adoption. Caban v. Mohammed, 99 S. Ct.
1760, 1765 (1979); Doe v. Department of Social Servs., 337 N.Y.S.2d 102, 107 (Sup. Ct.
1972).
2. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword. In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1972).
3. Eg., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); F.S.
Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic
Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911). See Bilbe, Constitutionality of Sex-Based Differenti-
ations in the Louisiana Community Property Regime, 19 Loy. L. REV. 373, 377 (1973).
4. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
5. Racial and ethnic classifications are suspect. Regents of the University of
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which interfere with "fundamental" rights,6 the Court exercises
strict scrutiny. Accordingly, a classification will not be upheld unless
it promotes a compelling state interest and such interest cannot
reasonably be accomplished through less drastic means.7 An applica-
tion of the intermediate level of scrutiny results in the validation of
a classification if it is "reasonable, not arbitrary," and if it rests
upon "some ground of difference having a fair and substantial rela-
tionship to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly
circumstanced shall be treated alike."8
Although all the members of the Court do not agree on the stan-
dard of review to be applied in gender-based discrimination cases,9
an intermediate standard has been used most frequently in recent
cases."0 Using such a standard, the Court in Reed v. Reed" invali-
dated a state statute which gave a mandatory preference to males
in the appointment of estate administrators. Thus, Reed estab-
lished that a state's interest in administrative convenience may not
shield gender classifications from invalidation as it might in circum-
stances requiring only minimal scrutiny.'" In Craig v. Boren' the
majority, relying heavily on Reed, frankly embraced the new inter-
mediate scrutiny test: "[t]o withstand constitutional challenge,
previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives.""5 The Craig Court uti-
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978). Traditionally a class may be designated as
suspect if it is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
6. Fundamental rights generally are viewed as those "explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
1, 33-34 (1973).
7. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634, 637 (1969).
8. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971), quoting S.F. Royster Guano Co. v!
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
9. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
10. E.g., Orr v. Orr, 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). But see Parham v. Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 1742
(1979); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
11. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
12. Although the Court purported to use the rational basis test, subsequent deci-
sions have recognized Reed as a significant departure from this traditional test. E.g.,
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-98 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688
(1973). See Note, Gender-Based Discrimination and a Developing Standard of Equal
Protection Analysis, 46 U. CINN. L. REV. 572, 575-76 (1977).
13. 404 U.S. at 76; Note, supra note 12, at 578.
14. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
15. Id. at 197. Justice Rehnquist opined that the Court's conclusion came out of
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lized this standard to strike down an Oklahoma beer statute that
allowed females to buy beer at an earlier age than males. No pre-
vious decision of the Court had applied an elevated level of scrutiny
to invalidate a statutory discrimination operative against males."6
The Court has also relied upon the due process clause to protect
individuals from legislation which creates arbitrary gender-based
distinctions. Once a finding has been made that the classification
has resulted in the deprivation of life, liberty, or property, the Court
requires that some procedural protection be afforded. 8 The kind of
protection required is then determined by balancing the interest of
the state against the degree of deprivation. 9
Within the last decade the parental rights of unwed fathers
have been afforded protection under both the equal protection and
due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 0 That unwed
fathers could have constitutionally protected relationships with their
children was first proclaimed in Stanley v. Illinois.2 Under the Illi-
nois statutory scheme challenged in Stanley, the children of an
unwed father, upon the death of their mother, automatically became
wards of the state.22 Using procedural due process language, 23 the
thin air. 429 U.S. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16. See 429 U.S. at 219 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist viewed
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), as the exception to this trend. 429 U.S. at 219
n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See the Court's statement in Stanley at note 24, infra.
This statement was made by the Court in its due process analysis and apparently was
not intended as an equal protection standard.
17. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
18. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 544-45 (1977) (White,
J., dissenting); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1975).
19. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1975).
20. Traditionally an unwed father has had no rights with respect to his child, but
he has had many responsibilities. He has been forced to contribute to the support and
care of the child and the mother but not allowed to participate in decisions concerning
the child's fate. R. ISSAC, ADOPTING A CHILD TODAY 51 (1965). In the adoption process,
agencies have neglected him. R. BERNSTEIN, HELPING UNMARRIED MOTHERS 142 (1971).
Generally, the attitude toward the unwed father can be described as punitive. NEWS-
WEEK, March 27, 1972, at 100.
21. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
22. Id. at 646. State laws that govern the unwed father's rights classify parents
by two methods: the legitimacy of the child and the sex of the parent. All other
parents were afforded a hearing on parental fitness before the state assumed custody
of their children; thus Stanley had fewer rights than the fathers of legitimate children
and the mothers of all children. It was undisputed that Stanley was the father of the
children, that he had supported them, and that he had lived with them all their lives.
Id. at 650 n.4. Citing Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1968), and Glona v. Ameri-
can Guaranty & Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75-76 (1968), the Court noted that
family relationships not legitimated by marriage had previously been afforded constitu-
tional protection. 405 U.S. at 651-52.
23. Although Stanley has been interpreted as imposing a procedural due process
requirement, see, e.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and
1980]
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Court balanced the state's interest in promoting the welfare of il-
legitimate children against the father's interest in retaining custody
of his children; 4 it then determined that the father was entitled to a
hearing on his parental fitness25 before the state could assume cus-
tody of his children. Additionally, the Illinois statutory scheme did
not satisfy the requirements of the equal protection clause since it
denied a properly focused hearing to unmarried fathers while grant-
ing such a hearing to all other Illinois parents. Although Stanley
afforded protection for the unwed father against direct action by the
state, it left unresolved the degree of protection a state must afford
the rights of unwed fathers in a situation in which the countervail-
ing interests are more substantial.
The Court was faced with such a case in Quilloin v. Walcott, 8 in
which the biological father sought to block the adoption of his child
by the child's stepfather.29 The biological father claimed that the
Georgia statutes violated the equal protection and due process
clauses by denying him an absolute veto over the adoption of his
child in the absence of a finding that he was unfit as a parent." The
trial court found that Quilloin visited his child occasionally and ir-
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843 (1977), the decision had a substantive impact on Illinois law.
See Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's
Parental Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581, 1607-08 (1972).
24. The Court acknowledged the legitimacy of the state objectives, but empha-
sized that the interests "of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably
warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection." 405
U.S. at 651.
25. The statute contained an irrebuttable presumption that unmarried fathers are
unfit to raise their children. Id. at 658.
The parental fitness test focuses on the conduct of the parent, rather than the in-
terests of the child. A finding of unfitness is usually premised on abuse, abandonment,
or neglect of the child, and is required before involuntary termination of a biological
parent's rights. See, e.g., Wood v. Beard, 290 So. 2d 675 (La. 1974); Corey L. v. Martin
L., 45 N.Y.2d 383, 389, 380 N.E.2d 266, 269, 408 N.Y.S.2d 439, 441-42 (1978). See also
Griffiths v. Roy, 263 La. 712, 269 So. 2d 217 (1972). This test has been criticized for
placing too much emphasis on the child's physical well-being and subordinating his
psychological well-being to the parent's right to assert a biological tie. J. GOLDSTEIN,
A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 4 (1973).
26. 405 U.S. at 657-58.
27. Id at 658. This equal protection holding was deduced from and dependent
upon the due process holding since the Court had already determined that a hearing
on fitness was necessary. One explanation for this alternative holding is found in Chief
Justice Burger's dissenting opinion. He stated that the Court's jurisdiction was limited
to the equal protection issue since no due process issue had been raised in or decided
by the state courts. 405 U.S. at 659-60 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
28. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
29. Quilloin filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus seeking visitation
rights, a petition for legitimation, and an objection to the adoption. Id. at 250.
30. Id. at 253.
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regularly provided support, but the court did not make a finding of
unfitness.3' Nevertheless, the court determined that adoption by the
stepfather, rather than legitimation or visitation by the natural
father, 2 was in the "best interests of the child."33 The Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, and Quilloin
appealed to the United States Supreme Court, focusing his equal
protection claim on the statutory distinction between married and
unmarried fathers."' The claim that the statutes also made gender-
based distinctions in violation of the equal protection clause was not
considered. 5
The Supreme Court ruled that Quilloin's substantive rights were
not violated by the application of a "best interests of the child" stan-
dard, and that due process requirements were met." Although
recognizing that the biological parent/child relationship is constitu-
tionally protected, the Court emphasized that the adoption would
31. Id. at 251.
32. Id. The trial court could not have granted visitation rights to Quilloin in addi-
tion to the adoption by the stepfather. Since the petition for legitimation was denied,
Quilloin lacked standing to object to the adoption. Id at 251 n.11.
33. Id. at 251. Many state statutes relating to custody and adoption require that
disposition of the child be made according to the "best interests of the child." See, e.g.,
LA. R.S. 9:403 (Supp. 1956 & 1970), 9:432 (Supp. 1960); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70
(McKinney 1977). Often no criteria are provided by these statutes, and the court is
guided by principles which reflect "considered social judgments in this society respec-
ting the family and parenthood." Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 549, 356 N.E.2d
277, 283, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 827 (1976), quoting Matter of Spense-Chapin Adoption Serv.
v. Polk, 29 N.Y.2d 196, 204, 274 N.E.2d 431, 436, 324 N.Y.S.2d 937, 944 (1971). Some
states have enacted "best interests" statutes. Criteria set forth in these statutes in-
clude: (1) the capacity and the disposition of the competing parties to provide for the
material, emotional, and moral needs of the child; (2) the moral fitness and mental and
physical health of the competing parties; (3) the existing relationship between the child
and the competing parties; (4) the child's present environment; (5) the permanence, as a
family unit, of the existing or prospective circumstances; (6) the reasonable preference
of the child; and (7) other factors deemed relevant by the court. See, e.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 722.23 (1970). It has been suggested that the psychological well-being of the
child should be the focal point of the "best interests" determination and that the court
must insist upon compiling all the facts, psychological and otherwise. Foster, A "Bill of
Rights" for Children, 1 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. AND LAW 199, 208 (1973).
34. 434 U.S. at 253.
35. Id. at 253 n.13.
36. Id. at 255. This indicates that the stringent parental fitness test required by
Stanley is not the standard to be used in all cases in which maintenance of parental
rights is at issue. One writer suggests that the parental fitness determination is essen-
tial when a putative father has fulfilled a substantial parental role as was the case in
Stanley. But when another man fills the parental void left by-the manifestly disinter-
ested biological father, the parental fitness protection surrounding the biological rela-
tionship can be regarded as waived in the "best interests of the child." Note, The




give full recognition to an existing family relationship and that at no
time had the unwed father been a de facto member of the child's
family unit. 7
In considering Quilloin's equal protection claim, the Court held
that the state could recognize the difference in the extent of the
commitment to the welfare of the child and could give unwed
fathers less veto authority than it affords married or divorced
fathers."8 Although Quilloin had the same child support obligations
as a divorced father, his parental interests were distinguishable on
the basis that he had "never exercised actual or legal custody over
his child ... and thus ... never shouldered any significant responsi-
bility with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or
care of the child."39 Again, as in Stanley, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that the extent of commitment to the welfare of the child, as
evidenced by the fulfillment of familial roles, is a prime factor to be
considered in determining the rights of unwed fathers.
In Caban v. Mohammed,"° the mother and her husband, the
Mohammeds, petitioned to adopt her children born out of wedlock;
the biological father and his wife, the Cabans, cross-petitioned for
adoption. Both parties were given an opportunity to be heard, but
New York law prevented the Cabans from adopting the children
since Mrs. Mohammed, the natural mother, had withheld her con-
sent." Caban could have blocked adoption by the Mohammeds only
by showing that such adoption was not in the best interests of the
37. 434 U.S. at 255. After weighing the interests of the state, the child, and the
existing family (which included the psychological father and the natural mother)
against those of the biological father, the Court subordinated the biological father's
rights to those of the existing family. Id This subordination promoted the family role
policies recognized by the Court. These policies included the preservation of an ex-
isting family unit and the requirement that parental responsibilities be undertaken
before parental rights can be asserted. See Note, supra note 36, at 616.
38. 434 U.S. at 256. This distinction was permissible "[u]nder any standard of
review." Id.
39. Id.
40. 99 S. Ct. 1760 (1979).
41. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977). See note 1, supra. The court has
authority to dispense with consent to an adoption when it finds that the parent had
abandoned the child. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977). Evaluation of the
best interests of the child is made only after the court has determined that the parent
is unfit and that consent is no longer required. Corey L. v. Martin L., 45 N.Y.2d 383,
380 N.E.2d 266, 408 N.Y.S.2d 439 (1978). Since there were no grounds for terminating
Mrs. Mohammed's rights, evaluation of the best interests of the children was re-
stricted to a consideration of the benefits of adoption by the Mohammeds. By adoption
the children would have been legitimated. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 114 (McKinney 1977).
Without adoption Caban could have retained his parental rights.
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children.4 2 After a full hearing the trial court granted the Moham-
meds' petition, thereby terminating Caban's parental rights and obli-
gations .4
3
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Caban claimed
that the distinction drawn by the New York provision between the
parental rights of unwed fathers and those of other parents violated
the equal protection clause, and that the Court's decision in Quilloin
recognized the due process right of natural fathers to maintain a
parental relationship with their children absent a finding that they
were unfit.44 Applying the standard of review adopted in Craig,5 the
Court determined that the sex-based statutory distinction was not
substantially related to the state's important objective of furthering
the interests of illegitimate children."6 The Court reasoned that some
unwed fathers, if given the opportunity, may oppose adoption of
their illegitimate children and wish to participate in decisions con-
cerning their care, just as may unwed mothers." Additionally, the
statutory assumption that unwed fathers are invariably less quali-
fied and entitled than mothers to exercise a concerned judgment as
to the fate of their children was ruled an overbroad generalization,
unsupported by evidence of any universal difference between mater-
nal and paternal relations at all stages of a child's development.48
42. At the hearing Caban's evidence was considered only insofar as it reflected
upon the Mohammeds' qualifications as parents. See note 1, supra.
43. By adoption, the natural parents are made legal strangers to the adoptive chil-
dren. However, the children's rights to distribution of property under the natural
parent's will are not affected. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1977).
44. 99 S. Ct. at 1764.
45. See text at note 15, supra.
46. 99 S. Ct. at 1768. Application of an intermediate standard of review continues
the trend of analyzing gender-based classifications with heightened scrutiny. See cases
cited at note 10, supra. It also indicates that the unwed father's parental rights,
although not "fundamental," deserve more protection than economic interests. See text
at notes 3-7, supra. Cf. Parham v. Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 1742 (1979) (analyzing with mini-
mal scrutiny a Georgia statute that precluded a father who had not legitimated his
child from suing for the child's wrongful death).
47. 99 S. Ct. at 1768. This determination recognized that termination of the
natural parent's rights and substitution of a new parent through adoption is not
always in the best interests of the child. Many legitimate children are not adopted by
their stepparents because the consent of a legitimate parent is withheld. Problems
that would be created by requiring the unwed father's consent are similar to those
now present when the divorced father's consent is required. Some of these problems
are solved by termination of parental rights through statutory provisions on abandon-
ment and neglect. Assuming that a parent will not arbitrarily withhold consent to an
adoption in the best interests of the child, a scheme such as this provides a large
measure of protection to the child. But there is a problem of determining what the
best interests of the child are, and who will make that determination.
48. Id. at 1766-67. This language suggests that there may be a difference between
maternal and paternal relations at a certain phase of a child's life that would justify a
1980]
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The circumstances of the case demonstrated that an unwed father
may have a relationship with his children fully comparable to that of
the mother. 9 Caban manifested a "significant paternal interest" in
the children, forming a "substantial relationship" with them."0 Thus,
in some situations the state must afford a degree of protection to
the unwed father's paternal rights equal to that afforded to the
unwed mother."'
distinction based on sex. See text at notes 53-55, infra. The Court determined that the
parents were similarly situated. 99 S. Ct. at 1772 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See notes
11-13, supra, and accompanying text. Neither parent could unilaterally legitimate the
children.
In Parham v. Hughes, 99 S. Ct. 1742 (1979), the Georgia statute in question pre-
cluded any father who had not legitimated his child from suing for the wrongful death
of the child, but allowed all mothers to do so. In upholding the statute, 'the Court con-
cluded that mothers and fathers of illegitimate children were not similarly situated
because only the father could unilaterally legitimate the child under Georgia law. Fail-
ure to exercise this ability allowed the state to treat mothers and fathers of illegiti-
mate children differently for the purposes of a wrongful death action. Id. at 1746-47.
The ability of the father to change his status for purposes of the statute was said to
distinguish the case from Caban, decided the same day. IM at 1748 n.9. This distinction
between Caban and Parham is inconsistent with the Court's remark in Quilloin: "We
would hesitate to rest decision on ... [Quilloin's failure to petition for legitimation]...
but we need not go that far .... " 434 U.S. at 254. Furthermore, in Parham Justice
White stated that Caban did not suggest that failure to establish paternity prior to the
adoption proceeding might justify discrimination against the father on the basis of
presumed differences in maternal and paternal relations. 99 S. Ct. at'1754 n.15 (White,
J., dissenting). Under an equal protection analysis, it would be illogical to penalize an
unwed Georgia father for failure to resort to an Available statutory procedure to
assert his parental rights, but afford an unwed New York father full protection of his
parental rights because such a proceeding is not available. Perhaps the two cases may
be distinguished more satisfactorily on the grounds of the nature of the rights asserted
by the respective fathers. In Caban the father sought protection of an existing parent/
child relationship; the father in Parham sought recognition of an economic interest.
Since economic interests have traditionally received less judicial solicitude, see text at
note 3, supra, it is not surprising that the Court would treat the withholding of a cash
benefit from a father after the death of his illegitimate child less favorably than the
discouragement or preclusion of a relationship between the two while living. This dif-
ference is emphasized by the Court's application of a different standard of review in
each case. See note 46, supra.
49. 99 S. Ct. at 1766. In this respect the decision is consistent with Quilloin and
Stanley. The pivotal point in each case seems to be the father's role in the child's fami-
ly unit.
50. Id at 1769. Caban was identified as the father on the children's birth certifi-
cates and had lived with the children and-their mother until she left taking the chil-
dren with her. Afterwards he maintained contact with the children through relatives.151. The Court objected to the undifferentiated distinction of the statute, which
was applicable in all circumstances. Id. at 1768 n.13 & 1769. However, the decision
does not require that both parents who have formed a substantial relationship with
their child be given veto authority over their child's adoption. But see 99 S. Ct. at 1779
(Stevens, J., dissenting). ,
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The Court acknowledged the possibility that unwed mothers as
a class are closer than unwed fathers to their newborn infants, but
rejected it as a basis for the legislative distinction in a case such as
this in which the children are older.2 Additionally, the Court noted
that means other than inflexible gender-based distinctions are avail-
able to encourage newborn adoptions." This raises the possibility
that a legislative gender-based distinction regarding the adoption of
newborns would not violate equal protection," but the opinion leaves
many questions unanswered regarding adoptions of this nature. Con-
sideration of how a mother and father are situated at birth provides
some guidance with respect to resolution of these questions.
Although the mother will form biological and perhaps emotional
ties with the child throughout pregnancy and at birth, the father
may also feel emotionally attached to the child during this period,
especially if he maintains a relationship with the mother. Requiring
only the mother's consent to an adoption prevents the father from
forming a "substantial relationship"55 with his child and is inconsis-
tent with the Court's reasoning in Caban.5 The Court seemingly
would allow the state to withhold the privilege of vetoing the child's
adoption when the father has never come forward to participate in
the rearing of his child." To the extent actual participation in rear-
52. 99 S. Ct. at 1766 & 1768. At the time proceedings were instituted, the children
were ages two and four.
53. I& at 1768. Facially, a statute requiring only the consent of the parent with
custody appears consistent with equal protection. However, custody determinations
are often slanted in favor of the mother. Assuming the fitness of the mother of an
illegitimate child, she will ordinarily be granted custody of the child in a contest be-
tween herself and the putative father. 2 H. FOSTER & D. FREED, LAW AND THE FAMILY
-NEW YORK § 29.6 (Supp. 1979). Therefore, it is possible that the equal protection
clause might be violated in the administration of a gender-neutral statute otherwise
constitutional.
54. The majority expressed no view as to whether difficulty in locating and identi-
fying unwed fathers at birth would justify such a distinction. 99 S. Ct. at 1768. The
dissenting justices would have allowed the distinction on the basis of the physical reali-
ty that it is the mother who carries and bears the child, as well as on the legal reality
that she alone may decide whether to bear the child and will have custody of the child
at birth. 99 S. Ct. at 1775 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 99 S. Ct. at 1772 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
55. The Court did not define this term, but clearly living with an "older child," as
Caban did, falls within the definition. The father's relationship with his child in
Quilloin was probably not considered "substantial."
56. In its discussion of the New York statute, the Court criticized the effect it
may have in allowing some alienated mothers to cut off arbitrarily the parental right
of fathers. 99 S. Ct. at 1769. Cf. LA. R.S. 9:402 (1950), 9:404 (1950 & Supp. 1958) (allow-
ing the mother of an illegitimate child, who has not been formally acknowledged or
legitimated by, the father, to surrender the child to an agency for adoption, ter-
minating all parental rights).
57. 99 S. Ct. at 1768. In Quilloin, the Court distinguished the case from one in
which the unwed father had or sought actual or legal custody of his child, indicating
19801
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ing the child is required, it is possible that the mother may be
forced to allow the father to participate if he wishes and is found fit
to do so. 8 Perhaps the father need only manifest a "significant
paternal interest" in the child when it is not possible to establish a
"substantial relationship," in order to acquire parental rights equiva-
lent to those of the mother. Forming a "substantial relationship"
with an unborn child would be difficult, but a father could show at
least some paternal interest in his child before birth, or even a
"significant paternal interest."5 Definition of these ambiguous terms
is necessary to determine in which circumstances an unwed father
has parental rights concerning his newborn child."
that actual participation is not required. 434 U.S. at 255. Even if the father has not
come forward, he may be statutorily entitled to notice of the adoption procedure. See,
e.g., UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 24; N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 111-a (McKinney 1978) (re-
quiring notice to any person who is openly living with the child and the child's mother
at the time the proceeding is initiated and who is holding himself out to be the child's
father, and to any person who has been identified as the child's father by the mother
in a written, sworn statement).
Notice to an absent father could invade the mother's privacy. 99 S. Ct. at 1776-77
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The Georgia Code provides that the biological mother, when
surrendering her parental rights, shall execute an affidavit setting forth the identity
and last known address of the biological father of her child and whether or not he has
lived with the child, contributed to his support, provided for the mother's support (in-
cluding medical care) during her pregnancy or during her hospitalization for the birth
of the child, or made an attempt to legitimate the child. She shall have the right not to
disclose the name and address of the father, but should she decline to provide such in-
formation, she may be required to appear in court to explain her refusal or her name
may be used in connection with the publication of notice to the putative father. GA.
CODE § 74-404 (1978).
58. See generally In re Tricia M., 74 Cal. App. 3d 125, 141 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1977),
cert denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). Under California law, a child with a "presumed
father" cannot be adopted without the father's consent. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7004(a)(4)
(West 1978). A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child when he receives
the child into his home and openly holds him out as his own natural child. CAL. CIV.
CODE § 7004 (West 1978). In In re Tricia M., 74 Cal. App. 3d 125, 144 Cal. Rptr. 554
(1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978), the California court held that where the
mother has frustrated the efforts of the natural father to hold his child out as his own,
the court may, if the father demonstrates his fitness to assume custody, first grant
him custody, then allow him to complete the conduct necessary to establish himself as
the "presumed father," and then order that his consent is necessary for the child's
adoption. 74 Cal. App. 3d at 134, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
59. The father could manifest a paternal interest in his unborn child in many
ways, but how "significant" it would be is questionable. For example, he could provide
prenatal care, support the mother financially and/or emotionally, prepare for the child's
birth, or make arrangements for the child's future.
60. Even assuming that the courts eventually supply a workable definition of
'substantial relationship" or "significant paternal interest," an investigation is likely to
be necessary in every case to determine the extent of the father's relationship with
the child prior to the adoption, and such investigations would not be without border-
line situations of interpretative difficulty.
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Although the Court acknowledged that the best interests of
some illegitimate children may require their adoption into new
families who will give them the stability of a normal, two-parent
home and also remove the stigma of illegitimacy,' it was unwilling
to balance these interests, as well as those of the state and the un-
wed mother, against the interests of the unwed father.2 The major-
ity chose to frame the issue presented in this case solely in equal
protection terms even though the dissenting justices considered the
due process challenge more substantial. 3 Had a due process balanc-
ing approach been taken, the Court would have weighed the right of
the father to a determination of unfitness against the interest of the
mother in maintaining her relationship with the child, the interests
of the children, the state's interest in the existence of a legitimate
family unit, and possibly the right of the family, as a unit, to remain
together."
A majority of the present Court would probably be willing, as a
matter of substantive due process, to allow the state, applying a sex-
neutral rule, to terminate the parental rights of a father such as
Caban without a determination of unfitness in order to allow an
adoption that is in the best interests of the child. 5 It is the undiffer-
entiated distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers, ap-
plicable in all circumstances where adoption of a child of theirs is at
issue, that is objected to by the Caban Court. 6 The majority opinion
in Caban does not require that both parents who have formed a
substantial relationship with their child be given veto authority
over their child's adoption. 7 Similarly, the four dissenting justices
61. Although marriage surely increases the chances that a child's parents will
stay together, it is no guarantee that a child will have a normal, two-parent home. One
might question how "normal" a two-parent home is today. Because of the current
divorce rate, the adoption of children by single persons, and unwed mothers who
choose to keep their children, the number of single-parent homes is increasing. NA-
TIONAL COUNCIL ON ILLEGITIMACY, ILLEGITIMACY: TODAY'S REALITIES 1 (1971). Thus, the
mere fact of being reared by one's mother alone is not likely to result in an assumption
that a child is illegitimate. Even if the child's status is known, the child may bear no
stigma of illegitimacy since non-marital pregnancy is becoming more socially accept-
able. Id
62. 99 S. Ct. at 1767-68.
63. 99 S. Ct. at 1779 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Caban claimed that he was denied
substantive due process when New York terminated his parental rights without first
finding him to be an unfit parent, but the Court expressed no view on this issue. 99 S.
Ct. at 1769 n.16.
64. See note 37, supra.
65. If this is allowed, criteria for establishing that best interests of the child
should be provided by state legislatures. See note 33, supra, and accompanying text.
66. 99 S. Ct. at 1768 n.13 & 1769.
67. But see 99 S. Ct. at 1779 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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are willing to allow termination of an unwed father's parental rights
without a finding of unfitness. Justice Stewart finds the absence of a
legal tie with the mother an appropriate basis for limiting the un-
wed father's substantive rights when his wishes and those of the
mother are in conflict and resolution in favor of the mother serves
the child's best interests. 8 Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, would allow the adoption when the
natural family unit has already been destroyed, the father has not
previously taken steps to legitimate the child, and a further require-
ment of a showing of unfitness would entirely deprive the child and
the state of the benefits of adoption.69
In light of Caban, reevaluation by the states of their respective
adoption schemes may be necessary'. Caban is of particular signifi-
cance to Louisiana for its adoption statutes are similar to those of
New York which were invalidated in the instant case. In Louisiana,
consent of a child's legitimate parents is required for adoption un-
less the child has been legally surrendered or declared abandoned."
For purposes of an agency adoption, any parent may surrender per-
manent custody of a child, after which the agency acts in lieu of the
68. 99 S. Ct. at 1771 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
69. 99 S. Ct. at 1780 (Stevens, J., dissenting). These opinions are consistent with
the views of legislatures and courts of several states. For example, some states have
statutes which require the unwed father's consent unless his identity or whereabouts
are unknown or he withholds his consent to an adoption found to be in the best in-
terests of the child. Under this type of provision the child's rights are paramount, and
particular cases and individual circumstances are taken into consideration to assure
promotion of the child's best interests. If promotion of the child's welfare is deemed
paramount in custody and adoption determinations, society will benefit greatly in the
long run. In addition, it will be the parents, rather than the unadopted child, who suf-
fer the consequences of the situationthey have created by having their parental rights
terminated. These statutes seem to provide the best method for furthering adoption of
illegitimate children. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (1976); VA. CODE § 63.1-
225 (1978). The Code of Virginia provides:
Consent shall be executed ... [bly the parents or surviving parent of a child born
out of wedlock. The consent of the father of a child born to an unmarried woman
shall not be required (i) if the identity of the father is not reasonably ascertain-
able, or (ii) if identity of such father is ascertainable and his whereabouts are
known, such father is given notice of the adoption proceeding by registered or
certified mail to his last known address and such father fails to object to the adop-
tion proceeding within twenty-one days of the mailing of such notice .... If after
hearing evidence the court finds that the valid consent of any person or agency
whose consent is hereinabove required is withheld- contrary to the best interests
of the child or is unobtainable, the court may grant the petition without such con-
sent.
VA. CODE § 63.1-225 (1978).
70. LA. R.S. 9:425 (1950 & Supp. 1976), 9:427 (1950); Moreland v. Craft, 244 So. 2d
37 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert denied, 258 La. 348, 246 So. 2d 197 (1971).
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parent in subsequent adoption proceedings.7 Notice of subsequent
proceedings need not be served on the parent." A surrender by the
mother of a child born out of wedlock, who has not been formally
acknowledged or legitimated by the father, terminates all parental
rights, including those of the father.73 Thus, in Louisiana an unwed
mother may arbitrarily terminate an unwed father's parental rights
even if the father has formed a substantial relationship with the
child or has come forward to care for the child." Since notice to the
unwed father is not required, he may be unaware of the surrender
and a subsequent adoption.
For purposes of a private adoption in Louisiana, any parent may
surrender custody of a child to a person or couple qualified to peti-
tion for adoption." The surrender must be made by the mother and
the father indicated on the child's birth certificate." If the father is
not indicated, the mother alone may make the surrender.7 This sur-
render terminates all parental rights, except the right to revoke
consent to the surrender within thirty days." Revocation may be
made only by the parents indicated on the child's birth certificate or
by a parent not so indicated but who has formally legitimated or
acknowledged the child prior to the adoption decree." As with the
agency adoption, the mother can unilaterally terminate the father's
parental rights if he does not take steps to assert those rights.
Louisiana's adoption provisions are probably unconstitutional in-
sofar as they discriminate against the unwed father on the basis of
sex and marital status."0 Both parents of a legitimate child and the
71. LA. R.S. 9:402 (1950).
72. LA. R.S. 9:425 (1950 & Supp. 1976).
73. LA. R.S. 9:404 (1950 & Supp. 1958); Golz v. Children's Bureau of New'Orleans,
Inc., 326 So. 2d 865, 870 (La.), appeal dismissed, 426 U.S. 901 (1976).
74. This was one basis for the Court's objection to the New York provision invali-
dated in Caban. 99 S. Ct. at 1769.
75. LA. R.S. 9:422.3, 422.5 (Supp. 1979).
76. LA. R.S. 9:422.4 (Supp. 1979).
77. Id.
78. LA. R.S. 9:422.8, 422.10 (Supp. 1979).
79. LA. R.S. 9:422.10 (Supp. 1979).
80. But see Collins v. Division of Foster Servs., No. 10,065 (La. App. 4th Cir. Sept.
11, 1979). Collins upheld the constitutionality of Revised Statutes 9:404, which pro-
vides:
A surrender by the mother of a child born out of wedlock who has not been for-
mally acknowledged or legitimated by the father terminates all parental rights ex-
cept those pertaining to property. The same shall be true as to a court order of
abandonment. However, no surrender or court order of abandonment as to only
one living parent of a legitimate child shall be binding upon the other living
parent.
The fourth circuit concluded that the statute discriminates only against unwed fathers
who have not identified themselves by acknowledgment or legitimation and thus does
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mother of an illegitimate child must surrender the child for adoption
or otherwise consent to an adoption. The unwed father alone is ig-
nored. Only by taking formal steps to acknowledge or legitimate his
child may an unwed father assert his parental rights, including the
right to notice and veto authority over adoption. 1 The constitution-
ality of such a requirement of formal action is questionable. In
Quilloin Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, remarked: "We
would hesitate to rest decision on ...[Quilloin's failure to petition
for legitimation] . *.". . " Justice White, who participated in the ma-
jority opinion in Caban, has stated that Caban did not suggest that
failure to establish paternity prior to the adoption proceeding might
justify discrimination against the father on the basis of presumed
differences in maternal and paternal relations.83 Thus, failure to com-
ply with requirements of formal action should not preclude assertion
of parental rights.
The disparate treatment under the Louisiana provisions might
be justified by a determination that unwed mothers and fathers are
not similarly situated in particular circumstances, 4 but the sex-
based distinction must be substantially related to an important state
objective. Presumably the purpose of the distinction is to further
the interests of illegitimate children, but the means for doing so
seem inappropriate." Louisiana's scheme is underinclusive88 in that
it prevents an interested unwed father from asserting his parental
rights by allowing surrender by the mother before he has the oppor-
not invidiously discriminate on the basis of sex. Collins v. Division of Foster Servs.,
No. 10,065, slip op. at 5 (La. App. 4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1979).
81. In Collins, the court stated that the father of an illegitimate child never ac-
quires parental rights if he fails to legitimate his child and thus does not affirmatively
indicate his intention to assume parental responsibilities. No. 10,065, slip op. at 6 (La.
App. 4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1979).
82. 434 U.S. at 254.
83. Parham v. Hughes, 99 S. Ct. at 1754 n.15 (White, J., dissenting).
84. The Collins court determined that "[m]others and fathers of illegitimate chil-
dren, from a realistic standpoint, are not similarly situated" because maternal and
paternal identification for illegitimate children vary vastly in degree of difficulty. No.
10,065, slip op. at 4 (La. App. 4th Cir. Sept. 11, 1979).
85. According to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, Revised Statutes 9:404 is a
rational solution to the problem of identification of the father of an illegitimate child
for such purposes as support and adoption. Furthermore, it promotes legitimacy by
giving a father an incentive to accept his parental responsibility and by penalizing him
for arbitrarily denying his child the benefits of legitimacy. Id. at 7.
86. The law must seek to bring within a classification all similarly situated so far
as means will allow. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). If the state has selected
for special treatment a small group from among those similarly situated, the classifica-
tion is underinclusive. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 527 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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tunity to do so."7 In addition, the scheme is overinclusive 5 since it
allows an unwed father who has no relationship with his child and
has not preyiously manifested an interest in the child to legitimate
or acknowledge and acquire the right to protection of his "parental
rights."
The Caban decision is a positive step toward equalizing the
treatment of men and women with respect to their parental rights.
87. Even if it is entirely within the father's power to remove himself from the dis-
ability imposed by the statute, the mother may surrender the child, terminating any
rights the father may have had, before he has the opportunity to acknowledge or
legitimate his child. Additionally, restrictive provisions now prevent fathers in certain
situations from legitimating their children. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 200; LA. R.S. 9:391
(Supp. 1979). Although Act 607 of 1979 apparently removed all impediments to formal
acknowledgement, previously a father might be unable to formally acknowledge or
legitimate his child, and thus he would be precluded from asserting his parental rights.
For example, in the Collins case, the biological father was a married man with two
legitimate offspring. Transcript of Proceedings Before Twenty-Fourth Judicial District
Court, Affidavit at 17, Collins v. Division of Foster Servs., No. 10,065 (La. App. 4th
Cir. Sept. 11, 1979). Consequently, he could neither formally acknowledge nor legiti-
mate his adulterous child. The child was surrendered to an agency by her mother, over
Collins' objections. He then sought custody of the child, but the trial court ruled that
the surrender by the mother, pursuant to Revised Statutes 9:404, had terminated his
parental rights. The fourth circuit affirmed the decision. No. 10,065 (La. App. 4th Cir.
Sept. 11, 1979). The court distinguished Revised Statutes 9:404 from the New York
provision held unconstitutional in Caban because of a father's ability to change his
status for purposes of the statute. Yet the court ignored the reality that Collins was
powerless to change his status, and did not consider the constitutionality of the pro-
hibition of Civil Code articles 200 and 204 against legitimation or acknowledgement
because Collins did not attempt to legitimate or acknowledge before the surrender. Id.
at 5 n.3. (Collins did execute an authentic act acknowledging the child after suit was
filed.) Although a father such as Collins may now formally acknowledge his child, he
must do so before a surrender by the mother.
The Collins court cited Quilloin, noting that the Supreme Court upheld a Georgia
statute which denied veto authority over an adoption to a natural father who had not
legitimated his child. Id. at 6 n.4. The facts of Collins seem to fit more closely the
cases the Court distinguished in Quilloin. Although neither Quilloin nor Collins was
ever a de facto member of their child's family unit, in Quilloin the Court explicitly
stated that it was not dealing with a case in which the father had ever sought custody,
and that the proposed adoption would give recognition to an existing family unit. Col-
lins sought custody of his child, and from the record it appears that the child, who was
less than a year old, was still with the agency. Furthermore, Quilloin held that the
father's due process rights were not violated by application of a "best interests of the
child" standard. The court in Collins did not even consider the best interests of the
child, but simply concluded that the father had not "shown any basis for entitlement to
a cognizable parental right which should be protected by due process considerations."
Id. at 8. Collins' biological connection and his attempt to accept responsibility for his
child should constitute such a basis.
88. If the classification extends to those not included in the group the statute was
intended to affect, it is overinclusive. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 527 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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States may require the consent of the unwed father, as well as the
unwed mother, for adoption. Apparently, state legislatures may, in
the alternative, dispense with the requirement of parental consent
for adoption and make the "best interests of the child" the control-
ling standard. According to Caban the equal protection clause re-
quires only that the parental rights of unwed fathers be afforded
the same degree of protection maternal rights receive. The decision
thus gives adequate protection to the unwed father who is inter-
ested in his child.
Since the constitutionality of many state adoption statutes is
now at least questionable, legislatures should consider a statutory
scheme that would serve the state interest in maintaining an effi-
cient adoption program, protect the rights of all concerned parents,
and promote the best interests of the child. In Caban the Court
gives little guidance in this area. By sidestepping the due process
issue, the Court avoided deciding whether the child's rights are
paramount to those of the parents. The Court could have provided
greater protection for children by expressly stating that parental
rights may be involuntarily terminated where necessary to allow an
adoption in the child's best interests. 9 If the state requires a finding
of unfitness before termination of parental rights, the parent's
rights, rather than the interests of the child, would be the para-
mount consideration in adoption proceedings. Instead, the welfare of
the child should be paramount, and it seems that parental rights
may fairly be predicated on parental responsibility and concern. The
parental right is sacred, but it is no more so than the welfare of the
child. °
Deborah Davis Alleman
Thrasher v. Leggett: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN THE
IMPOSITION OF LIQUOR VENDOR LIABILITY
The defendant served liquor to the plaintiff, a highly intoxicated
patron, in violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law.' After
89. Stanley presumably would not allow termination of parental rights without a
finding of unfitness where a stranger sought adoption. See text at notes 24-26, supra,
and accompanying text. But where one having a parent relationship with the child
seeks adoption, the best interests of the child should be the controlling factor in the
adoption determination.
90. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1963-1964 Term-Per-
sons, 25 LA. L. REV. 291, 301 (1965).
1. LA. R.S. 26:88(2) (1950). This statute provides: "No person holding a retail
dealer's permit and no agent, associate, employee, representative, or servant of any
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